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Abstract 
Using two modes of intervention delivery, the present study compared the effects of a 
cognitive defusion strategy with a thought distraction strategy on the emotional 
discomfort and believability of negative self-referential thoughts. One mode of 
intervention delivery consisted of a clinical rationale and training (i.e., Partial condition). 
The other mode contained a condition-specific experiential exercise with the negative 
self-referential thought in addition to the clinical rationale and training (i.e., Full 
condition). Non-clinical undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of five protocols: 
Partial-Defusion, Full-Defusion, Partial-Distraction, Full-Distraction, and a distraction-
based experimental control task. The Full-Defusion condition reduced the emotional 
discomfort and believability of negative self-referential thoughts significantly greater 
than other comparison conditions. The positive results of the Full-Defusion condition 
were also found among participants with elevated depressive symptoms.  
 
Key Words: acceptance; Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; believability; cognitive 
defusion; emotional discomfort; mindfulness; self-referential thoughts; thought 
distraction 
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Cognitive Defusion versus Thought Distraction: A Clinical Rationale, Training, and 
Experiential Exercise in Altering Psychological Impacts of Negative Self-Referential 
Thoughts 
According to acceptance- and mindfulness-based cognitive behavioral 
interventions, the major problem of dysfunctional private events (e.g., thoughts, feelings, 
physiological sensations, memories) is their stimulus functions (e.g., Fisher & Wells, 
2005; Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004; Segal, Teasdale, & Williams, 2004). For 
example, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999) explicitly states that the modification of problematic private events in function, not 
in form or frequency, is the aim of treatment. A set of techniques used particularly for this 
purpose in ACT is called cognitive defusion strategies (e.g., Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). Cognitive defusion strategies are often employed in contexts 
where clients are excessively entangled or fused with their difficult private events, such 
as a negative self-referential thought (e.g., “I am worthless”; “I” = “worthlessness”).  
Several published analogue studies are now available, demonstrating positive 
effects of defusion strategies (e.g., Healy et al., 2008; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & 
Twohig, 2004) and related techniques, such as acceptance and mindfulness (e.g., 
Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006; Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Feldner, 
Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004; Liverant, 
Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 2008). To date, the most thoroughly investigated defusion 
technique is a rapid vocal repetition of a thought (Titchener, 1910). Research has shown 
that, when delivered as the combined form of clinical rationale, training, and experiential 
exercise, the defusion strategy reduces emotional discomfort and believability of negative 
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self-referential thoughts (Masuda et al., 2004), and does so greater than the distraction-
based strategy (e.g., Masuda et al., 2010) which is theorized to be qualitatively different 
from defusion- and acceptance-based methods (Hayes et al., 2006).   
Although reporting the superiority of the defusion protocol to control-based 
strategies, previous studies are subject to several limitations. One methodological 
limitation is the within-group variability of active control-based comparison conditions 
(Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda et al., 2010). For example, in Masuda et al. (2010), 
whereas the contents/procedures of tasks in the defusion condition were fairly 
standardized across participants, the stimulus used by the participants for distraction in 
the thought distraction group was not systematically controlled.  
Additionally, given the multi-component nature of the intervention protocols, it is 
unclear which component or combination of components (i.e., clinical rationale, training, 
experiential exercise) in the defusion protocol is crucial in altering the stimulus function 
of the negative self-referential thought. This is an important research question because 
ACT emphasizes experiential learning, rather than mere rule-following, in the context of 
behavior change. Previous studies on acceptance-based coping strategies have shown that 
experiential components, when combined with a brief clinical rationale/instruction, play a 
crucial role in altering the stimulus function of target private events (McMullen et al., 
2008). Although supporting these findings, previous defusion studies (e.g., Masuda et al., 
2009) did not systematically investigate the additive effect of an experiential exercise.  
Furthermore, it is important to explore the effects of the defusion protocol within 
the context of psychopathology. All of the previously conducted analogue studies of the 
cognitive defusion strategy were conducted with non-clinical college sample (e.g., 
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Masuda et al., 2004, Masuda et al., 2009). Although evidence is limited, one study by 
Masuda et al. (2010) suggests a positive effect of the defusion strategy on self-referential 
negative thought among a college sample with elevated psychological distress. In the 
study, when delivered with the combined form of clinical rationale, training, and 
experiential exercise, the rapid vocal repetition strategy reduced the emotional discomfort 
and believability of negative self-referential thought among college students with 
elevated depressive symptoms. The study also suggested that the defusion protocol is 
effective regardless of the levels of depressive symptoms. Given these findings, it seems 
appropriate to first investigate whether the experiential exercise with the identified 
negative self-referential thought has any additive effects within a sub-sample of college 
students with elevated depressive symptoms, perhaps prior to investigating its effects 
among a clinical sample.     
Using a non-clinical college sample, the present study investigates the effects of 
the cognitive defusion protocol (i.e., rapid thought repetition) and thought distraction on a 
self-referential negative thought. These active intervention protocols were delivered with 
two different modes: (1) a brief clinical rationale and training using a neutral word (i.e., 
word “milk”), and (2) an experiential exercise with the identified negative self-referential 
thought in addition to the clinical rationale and training. Based on previous findings (e.g., 
Masuda et al., 2010, McMullen et al., 2008), it was hypothesized that the defusion 
condition, when delivered with  the clinical rationale, training, and experiential exercise, 
would reduce the emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-referential 
thoughts greater than comparison conditions. It was also hypothesized that, when the 
active interventions were delivered with a clinical rationale and training only, there 
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would be no significant group differences between defusion and thought distraction 
strategies. Finally, it was predicted that the defusion protocol containing the rationale, 
training, and experiential exercise, would produce favorable outcomes among the 
participants who reported elevated depressive symptoms. The present study employed the 
criteria of elevated depressive symptoms to select a subset of college students, in part 
because there is an established link between personal negative thoughts (the dependent 
variables of the study) and depression (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), and 
because depression is often conceptualized as an indicator of overall psychological well-
being and functioning (e.g., Ryff & Keyes, 1995).       
Method 
Participants and Setting 
The study was conducted at a large public 4-year university in Georgia. College 
undergraduates were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses through a web-
based research participant pool. Of 170 students who agreed to participate, 147 
individuals (n female = 115) completed the study. Thirty-three participants were excluded 
from the study because they did not meet the inclusion criteria regarding the minimum 
levels of emotional discomfort and believability associated with the identified negative 
self-referential thought (please see Thought Selection and Assessment Section below). 
The age of the final participants ranged from 17-48 years (M = 20.52, SD = 4.39). The 
ethnic composition of the sample was diverse with 45% (n = 66) identifying as “African 
American,” 27% (n = 39) as “Non-Hispanic European American,” 14% (n = 21) as 
“Asian American,” 7% (n = 10) as “Hispanic American,” 6% (n = 9) as “other” or 
“bicultural,” one as a “Native American,” and one missing value on ethnicity background. 
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Thirty-six participants reported a previous experience of seeking professional 
psychological services (e.g., medication treatment, psychotherapy, or counseling) for 
their psychological struggles. Of those, 10 participants reported that they had previously 
received at least one psychiatric diagnosis. Primary diagnoses of those participants 
included bipolar disorder (BD; n = 4), major depressive disorder (MDD; n = 1), 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; n = 1), anxiety disorder not otherwise specified (n = 
1), obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; n = 1), and attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD; n = 2).   
Demographic and Screening Form 
Following the consent procedure, participants completed a demographic form (i.e., 
gender, age, & ethnicity) and the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996). The BDI-II, a self-report measure of depression, is often used as a 
screening measure for general psychological functioning. As employed by a previous 
defusion study (Masuda et al., 2010), the study used the mean BDI-II score to 
approximate the cutoff for selecting a sub-sample of participants with elevated depressive 
symptoms. It is important to note that the selected sub-sample was comprised of those 
with elevated depressive symptoms, not those with a clinical diagnosis of a mood 
disorder (e.g., Major Depressive Disorder).  
Thought Selection and Assessment.  
Thought selection and assessment were administered by research investigators 
who were trained by the first author (A.M.). The procedure and instruction of the thought 
selection were closely scripted. Each participant was given an assessment form and orally 
instructed to identify one negative self-referential thought that occurs repeatedly and that 
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they had found disturbing and believable (e.g., “I am not smart”). Participants were then 
asked to restate the thought in one word (e.g., “idiot”) and rate it in terms of emotional 
discomfort and believability, using a 100-mm Likert-style visual analog scale. Responses 
ranged from 0 (not at all uncomfortable) to 100 (very uncomfortable) for the discomfort 
scale, and from 0 (not at all believable) to 100 (very believable) for the believability 
scale. The assessment was conducted before and immediately after the intervention. If 
participants could not come up with a thought that was above 50 on the discomfort and 
believability scales, they were prompted to identify another negative self-referential 
thought that was more uncomfortable and believable. Participants, who failed to meet the 
inclusion criteria after the prompt, were excluded from the study. Participants were not 
informed of the inclusion criteria, however. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions. The Partial-
Defusion and Partial-Distraction conditions consisted of a brief clinical rationale and 
training. The Full-Defusion and Full-Distraction protocol included an experiential 
exercise with the identified self-referential thought in addition to the clinical rationale and 
training. The distraction-based experimental control condition (e.g., reading an article 
about the rocks of Stonehenge) was added to the study in order to control non-specific 
factors.  
All of these intervention conditions were approximately 5 minutes long and 
closely scripted. The defusion and distraction conditions in each mode of delivery (i.e., 
partial and full) were designed to be equal in terms of (a) components, (b) duration, (c) 
sequence of components, and (d) contents of training (e.g., the use of the word “milk” 
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highlighting the use of the assigned strategy). Investigators ran participants in all 
conditions to minimize experimenter effects. A weekly research meeting was held to 
ensure adherence to the scripted interventions.  
Partial-Defusion Condition. This condition consisted of the defusion rationale and 
defusion training with an emotionally neutral word (i.e., “milk”). The rationale and 
training were drawn from an ACT manual (Hayes et al., 1999). The rationale included 
statements of positive and negative characteristics of human verbal activities. The 
rationale then addressed the automatic and contextual nature of verbal events/processes. 
To exemplify this, defusion training was then introduced to the participant. In the training, 
the participant was asked to say the word "milk" once and to notice its perceptual 
functions (e.g., “white,” “cold”). The participant was then instructed to repeat the word 
"milk" out loud as rapidly as possible for 20 seconds together with the experimenter and 
notice what happens to the perceptual functions during the training. Participants typically 
reported that the meaning of the word disappeared, and noted that more direct functions 
appeared (e.g., “It became just a sound.”). The experimenter then suggested that this 
defusion experience could be applicable to the participant’s self-referential negative 
thought, indicating that negative thoughts are also simply sounds with conventional 
meanings.  
Full-Defusion Condition. First, the participants in the Full-Defusion condition 
received the defusion rationale and training identical to those employed in the Partial-
Defusion condition. The participant was then instructed to repeat the one-word version of 
the self-referential negative thought (e.g., “idiot”) out loud as rapidly as possible until the 
experimenter said “stop.” To maintain engagement in the defusion strategy, the 
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experimenter provided a verbal prompt (i.e., "faster" and "louder") to the participant after 
10 and 20 seconds. The experimenter instructed the participant to discontinue the 
repetition by saying “stop” after 30 seconds passed.  
 Partial-Distraction Condition. This condition consisted of a thought distraction 
rationale and training. The rationale and training were drawn from emotion regulation 
literature (e.g., Gross, 1998) and previous analogue studies (e.g., Cioffi & Holloway, 
1993; Masuda et al., 2010). It is important to note that the thought distraction protocols of 
the present study were not derived from a treatment manual of any specific intervention 
approach that involves a distraction strategy, such as dialectical behavior therapy (DBT; 
Linehan, 1993). In the present study, the thought distraction strategy was roughly defined 
as an effort of moving attention away from a given event altogether by selectively 
attending to another emotionally less distressing event or situation (Gross, 1998). The 
thought distraction rationale began with a statement suggesting that cognitions cause 
actions and emotions, and that negative thoughts are the source of human suffering. The 
rationale then suggested that distracting oneself from negative thoughts by thinking of 
something different is a solution. Following the brief rationale, the participant received 
thought distraction training using the word “milk” and a picture of simple geometric 
figures (i.e., a circle, triangle). Similar to the defusion condition, the participant was 
asked to say the word "milk" once and to notice all of its perceptual functions. Then, the 
participant was instructed not to think of the word “milk” by focusing on the picture of 
simple geometric figures. The experimenter provided a verbal prompt (i.e., "don’t think 
about milk") to the participant at five second increments for 20 seconds before telling the 
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participant to stop.  The experimenter then suggested applying this experience to his or 
her negative self-referential thought in order to prevent psychological discomfort.  
Full-Distraction Condition. The participant in the Full-Distraction condition 
initially received the distraction rationale and training identical to those employed in the 
Partial-Distraction condition. The participant was then instructed to distract from the 
target negative self-referential thought by focusing on the picture of geometric shapes 
until the experimenter said “stop.” The experimenter provided a verbal prompt (i.e., 
“don’t think about [one-word thought]") to the participant at 10 second increments.  The 
experimenter said "stop" after 30 seconds passed.  
Distraction-based Experimental Control Condition. This condition did not 
include a rationale, training, or experiential exercise. The participant was instructed to 
read an emotionally neutral article about the rocks of Stonehenge for five minutes.  
Effectiveness and Usefulness Measures 
 Immediately after the completion of the post-intervention assessment, the 
participant was asked to rate the assigned strategy in terms of effectiveness, feasibility, 
and intention to use in the future. More specifically, using a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), the participant answered the following 
questions: (a) “I found this strategy very effective (i.e., effectiveness),” “I found this 
strategy easy to use (i.e., feasibility),” and “I will use it again when I have a difficult 
thought (i.e., intention to use).”     
Results 
Pre-intervention Group Differences 
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ANOVAs revealed that the groups did not differ in BDI-II score and pre-
intervention emotional discomfort and believability (Fs < 1.07, ps > .37). ANCOVAs 
revealed that, while controlling for the dependent variable of interest at pre-intervention, 
there were no main effects of experimenter in emotional discomfort or believability of 
negative self-referential thoughts at post-intervention in each experimental condition, (Fs 
< 2.09, ps > .132).  
With respect to demographic variables, controlling for the intervention condition 
and the dependent variable of interest at pre-intervention, partial correlations revealed 
that gender (categorized as 1 = female, 2 = male) or ethnicity background (dichotomized 
as 1 = Non-Hispanic European American, 2 = Ethnic minority) were not significantly 
correlated to emotional discomfort and believability of the self-referential negative 
thought at post-intervention. However, age was found to be significantly and negatively 
correlated with the dependent variables of interest at post-intervention (rs < -30, p < .001). 
Given this set of findings, an ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether the 
intervention groups significantly differed from one another in the age of participants. 
Results revealed no significant main effect of intervention group, F (4, 142) = 1.00, p 
> .40.        
Effects on Self-Referential Negative Thoughts 
The means, standard deviations, and effect sizes of emotional discomfort and 
believability scores of the negative self-referential thoughts for all conditions are 
presented in Table 1. The results for the emotional discomfort and believability scores 
were analyzed separately, using two 5 (condition) by 2 (time) repeated measure 
ANOVAs.   
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Emotional Discomfort. Results revealed a main effect for time, F(1, 142) = 107.95, 
p < .001, and a two way interaction between condition and time, F(4, 129) = 9.21, p < 
.001 (see Figure 1). The interaction was decomposed both by looking at the effects of 
time across each condition and by looking at the effects of condition at post-intervention. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that emotional discomfort at post-intervention was found 
to be significantly lower than pre-intervention emotional discomfort in all conditions (ts 
> 2.29, ps < .05). Effect size analyses revealed a moderate or large within group effect 
size in all active conditions (see Table 1). A small within effect size was also found in the 
experimental control condition.  
At post-intervention, the Full-Defusion group reported significantly lower levels of 
emotional discomfort than comparison groups (ps < .01). No other significant group 
differences were found at post-intervention (ps > .05). Similarly, effect size analyses 
revealed a large effect size in the comparisons between the Full-Defusion group and the 
other four comparison conditions, and a small effect size in the comparison between 
Partial-Defusion and experimental control groups. 
Believability. Results showed a main effect for time, F(1, 142) = 116.99, p < .001, 
and a two way interaction between condition and time, F(4, 142) = 7.39, p < .001 (see 
Figure 1). Post-intervention believability was significantly lower than pre-intervention 
believability across all conditions (ts > 2.32, ps < .05). Effect size analyses also revealed 
a moderate to large within group effect size across all active intervention conditions. A 
smaller within group effect size was found in the experimental control group.  
At post-intervention, the Full-Defusion group reported significantly lower 
believability than the other four groups (ps < .01). No other significant group differences 
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were observed at post-intervention (ps > .05). Similarly, a large effect size was found in 
the comparisons between Full-Defusion and the other four conditions. Additionally, in 
the comparisons between Partial-Defusion and Partial-Distraction conditions, between 
Partial-Defusion and experimental control group, and between Full-Distraction and 
experimental control groups, a small effect size was found. These results suggest that at 
post-intervention, the effect of Partial Defusion on believability was greater than those of 
Partial-Distraction and experimental control conditions and that the effect of Full-
Distraction condition was greater than that of experimental control.    
Effects on Individuals with Elevated Depressive Symptoms 
 The mean score of the BDI-II in 147 participants was 10.85 (SD = 7.99). Using 
the BDI-cut off score of 10, 71 participants (nfemale = 55) were selected as individuals with 
elevated depressive symptoms (see Table 2). The age of these participants ranged from 
17-36 years (M = 20.63, SD = 4.11). The ethnic composition of the sample was diverse 
with 41% (n = 29) identifying as “African American,” 28% (n = 20) as “Non-Hispanic 
European American,” 14% (n = 10) as “Asian American,” 7% (n = 5) as “Hispanic 
American,” 8% (n = 6) as “other” or “bicultural,” and one as a “Native American.” 
Twenty-two participants reported a previous experience of seeking professional 
psychological service, and six of them reported that they previously received at least one 
psychiatric diagnosis. The primary psychiatric diagnosis included BD (n =3), MDD (n = 
1), GAD (n = 1), and OCD (n = 1). ANOVAs revealed that pre-intervention emotional 
discomfort and believability and BDI-II scores did not differ significantly by group (Fs < 
1.05, ps > .38). 
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Emotional Discomfort. A 5 (condition) by 2 (time) repeated measure ANOVA 
revealed the main effect for time, F(1, 66) = 53.77, p < .001, and a two way interaction 
between condition and time, F(4, 66) = 7.35, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed a 
significant reduction of emotional discomfort at post-treatment as compared to pre-
treatment in all groups (ps < .05), except for the control group. Similarly, effect size 
analyses revealed a moderate to large within-group effect size among the four active 
intervention conditions.   
At post-intervention, the Full-Defusion group reported significantly lower levels of 
emotional discomfort than the other four groups (ps < .01). No other significant group 
differences were observed at post-intervention (ps > .05). Furthermore, effect size 
analyses revealed a large effect size in the comparisons between Full-Defusion and the 
other four conditions, and a small effect size in the comparison between the experimental 
control and three other active conditions (i.e., Partial-Defusion, Partial-Distraction, and 
Full-Distraction).   
Believability. A 5 (condition) by 2 (time) repeated measure ANOVA showed a 
main effect for time, F(1, 66) = 55.05, p < .001, and a two way interaction between 
condition and time, F(4, 66) = 5.23, p < .01. Once again, pairwise comparisons revealed a 
significant reduction of believability at post-treatment as compared to pre-treatment in all 
conditions (ps < .05), except for the control condition. Results of effect size analyses 
were consistent with those of statistical significance, revealing a moderate to large within 
group effect size across all active conditions and a small within group effect size in the 
experimental control group.  
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At post-intervention, the Full-Defusion group reported significantly lower levels of 
believability than the Partial-Distraction and control groups (ps < .05). No other 
significant group differences were found at post-intervention believability (ps > .05). 
Somewhat consistent with the findings of statistical significance, effect size analyses 
revealed a moderate to large effect size in the comparisons between Full-Defusion and 
the four comparison conditions. A small to moderate effect size of Partial Defusion was 
found when compared to the two distraction conditions and experimental control 
condition. Finally, a small effect size was found in the comparisons between the two 
distraction condition, and between Full-Distraction and experimental control.        
Exploratory Analyses on the Role of Depressive Symptoms 
 Because similar patterns were found between the overall participant group and the 
subgroup with elevated depressive symptoms, the role of depressive symptoms (i.e., BDI-
II scores) was investigated further. Using the overall sample of 147 participants, a 
hierarchical regression analysis was conducted separately for each post-intervention 
outcome variable. In the analysis, the BDI-II score was entered in the first step, followed 
by the variable of interest at pre-intervention and the intervention condition (i.e., dummy 
coded) in the second step. Results revealed that depressive symptomatology was a 
predictor of emotional discomfort at post-intervention (β = .19, t = 2.35, p = .02).  
However, when emotional discomfort at pre-intervention and intervention condition were 
taken into consideration, depressive symptomatology was no longer a significant 
predictor (β =.09, t = 1.14, p > .25). Depressive symptomatology was not found to be a 
predictor of believability at post-intervention (β =.07, t = -.86, p = .39). 
Usefulness Measures    
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 A series of ANOVAs revealed main effects of the intervention condition in 
effectiveness, feasibility, and intention to use ratings (Fs > 2.90, ps < .05). In the 
effectiveness rating, both Partial- and Full-Defusion conditions were rated more effective 
than the Partial- and Full-distraction conditions and the control condition (ps < .01). With 
respect to feasibility, the Partial-Defusion protocol was found to be more feasible than the 
Partial- and Full-Distraction conditions and the control condition (p < .01). In addition, 
the Full-Defusion condition was rated more feasible than the Partial- and Full-Distraction 
conditions (p < .05). Regarding the intention to use, participants in the Partial-and Full-
Defusion conditions reported that they would use the assigned strategy in the future more 
so  than those in the Partial Distraction and control conditions (p <. 05). 
Discussion 
The study has shown the additive effect of experiential exercise with a target 
negative self-referential thought by systematically manipulating the mode of intervention 
delivery. The Full-Defusion protocol that contains a clinical rationale, training, and 
experiential exercise, reduces emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-
referential thought more so than thought distraction strategies and the defusion strategy 
that contains the clinical rationale and training only (i.e., Partial-Defusion). The latter 
finding is particularly interesting because the participants in the Full- and Partial-
Defusion conditions perceived their assigned protocols to be equally effective. 
Additionally, results suggest that the Full-Defusion protocol is effective even among 
participants with elevated depressive symptoms and that its positive impact can be 
independent of the level of depressive symptoms.  
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The present study has two notable clinical implications. Results of the study 
suggest that it is important to include an experiential component in cognitive defusion 
intervention. Whereas it is crucial to establish a verbal context that promotes the 
acquisition of cognitive defusion (Masuda et al., 2009), a clinical rationale and training 
may not be sufficient for altering the stimulus function of target private events. As 
suggested by Hayes and colleagues (1999), the inclusion of an experiential component, in 
the combination with clinical rationale and training, seems to maximize its effect.  
A second implication is that the present defusion strategy can be applicable to 
diverse clients with a wide range of symptom severity. As speculated elsewhere (Masuda 
et al., 2010), a long-term effect of rapid word repetition is unlikely. However, the 
defusion strategy seems to be effective, regardless of symptom severity, to learn 
experientially what it is likely to be defused from difficult thoughts at least temporarily. 
Clinically, the defusion strategy can be used for introducing a perspective and experience 
of cognitive defusion and for establishing a context that promotes the acquisition of 
cognitive defusion.       
The present study has several theoretical implications. In recent years, there have 
been heated conceptual debates about whether acceptance- and defusion-based strategies 
are fundamentally different from conventional coping strategies, such as control and 
distraction techniques (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2008; Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008). 
Although there is no consensus, literature suggests that the two strategies may be 
fundamentally different from each other, given the differential effects on the contexts 
where they are employed (e.g., McCaul, Monson, & Maki, 1992). In a previous study 
(Gutierrez, Luciano, Rodriguez, & Fink, 2004), the superiority of an acceptance strategy 
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over a distraction strategy emerged in a greater levels of pain, while both strategies were 
equally effective in lower levels of pain. The present study extends this knowledge by 
suggesting that the differential effects between the two strategies may also be moderated 
by the mode of intervention delivery. When the intervention protocol contains only a 
clinical rationale and training, the differential effects are unlikely or small. However, the 
superiority of the defusion strategy seems to emerge when the protocols include an 
experiential component with target private events, combined with a clinical rationale and 
training.  
In the present study, the Full-Distraction protocol was found to be no more 
effective or slightly more effective than the experimental control conditions. The set of 
findings is somewhat surprising because a previous study (Masuda et al., 2010) shows 
that the full distraction strategy is an effective strategy in reducing emotional discomfort 
and believability of negative self-referential thought, although its effects are smaller than 
those of the full defusion protocol. Although the exact nature of these differential effects 
is unclear, the differences may be in part because of methodological variability in the two 
studies. In the previous study, the participants in the distraction condition were allowed to 
freely choose the stimulus used for distracting them from their negative self-referential 
thoughts. Given the procedure, the participants might have been able to engage in a 
distraction strategy that was already in their behavioral repertoire (e.g., focusing on a 
positive image in their mind, thinking of upcoming events). On the other hand, the 
stimulus used for the present distraction (i.e., a picture of geometric figures) was 
systematically controlled to increase the methodological rigor. As the effectiveness and 
feasibility ratings show, it is speculated that the methodological rigor employed by the 
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present study might have hindered the ecological and practical value of the distraction 
strategy, diminishing its positive effects.    
Consistent with Masuda et al. (2010), much greater variability (SDs) of 
discomfort and believability scores is seen at post-intervention, relative to those at pre-
intervention. These results clearly reveal that there were larger inter-individual 
differences at post-intervention, suggesting the varying effects of interventions across 
participants. Investigating factors that may account for the variability, such as the content 
of negative self-referential thought, pre-intervention levels of emotional discomfort and 
believability, existing repertoire of cognitive defusion and associated processes, general 
psychological functioning, one’s verbal community, and demand characteristics, is an 
avenue for future study.    
Methodologically, it is speculated that the Full-Distraction protocol might have 
operated as a suppression strategy. Although the participant was clearly instructed to pay 
attention to the picture of the geometric figures prior to the experiential exercise, the 
verbal prompt used for the Full-Distraction condition during the experiential exercise was 
“don’t think about it,” which is closely related to a thought suppression strategy more so 
than a distraction method. Additionally, the perceived ineffectiveness of the assigned 
distraction strategy might have shifted the participant to a thought suppression method in 
response to the target self-referential thought.  
The present study has other limitations. The study did not examine the impact of 
actual repetition of the target thought alone. Literature on semantic satiation (Esposito & 
Pelton, 1971) suggests that word repetition without a rationale is unlikely to produce 
favorable effects. Each of the outcome variables was assessed by a single measure (i.e., 
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100-mm scale), which may inflate the effect sizes of interventions. Furthermore, similar 
to previous analogue experiments, the study did not include follow-up assessments. The 
goal of the defusion exercise is to simply help clients experientially realize that the 
psychological impact of even difficult private events is contextually controlled, not 
necessarily to reduce discomfort and believability in the long run. For this reason, follow-
up assessments may not be necessary. 
Yet another concern is the use of face-to-face format in delivering active 
interventions. Previous analogue studies (e.g., McMullen et al., 2008) employed a 
computerized program or audio-taped intervention in order to systematically control and 
manipulate the variables of interest. The current investigation employed a contact-based 
face-to-face format, a less stringent mode of intervention, in order to maintain a 
therapeutic atmosphere in an analogue setting. It appears important for future studies to 
optimize the balance between methodological rigor, practical utility, and generalizability 
of findings.   
Finally, perhaps the major limitation of the present study is the exclusive reliance 
on self-report measures. From an ACT perspective, discomfort and believability of 
private events are part of functional processes, and they should be studied within the 
context of ongoing stimulus-behavior relations. Self-report type methods do not measure 
these processes directly. Although it is difficult to directly assess the stimulus function of 
the negative self-referential thoughts, the development of a behavioral method that 
captures the function of self-referential thoughts seems extremely important.  
In sum, despite these limitations, the present investigation is the first study 
suggesting that an experiential component plays an important role in altering the stimulus 
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function of negative self-referential thoughts. Additionally, the study suggests that, when 
delivered with a clinical rationale, training, and experiential exercise, the defusion 
strategy is effective regardless of the level of depressive symptoms in a non-clinical 
sample. The present findings are encouraging, and further investigation on the process 
and effects of cognitive defusion and other coping strategies seems warranted. 
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Table 1 
Average Scores, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes of Emotional Discomfort and 
Believability of Negative Self-Referential Thoughts by Condition and Time 
 
 Emotional Discomfort  Believability 
 
Conditions: 
Pre 
 
Post 
 
Pre-
Post 
within 
d 
 Pre 
 
Post 
 
Pre-
Post 
within 
d 
1. Partial Defusion  (n = 27) 
 
79.67 
(12.76) 
62.85 
(25.26) 
.91  82.11 
(17.73) 
60.81 
(29.37) 
.95 
 
2. Full Defusion  (n = 30)  
 
79.17 
(11.96) 
39.53 
(24.91) 
1.57  74.93 
(13.51) 
38.87 
(21.99) 
1.57 
 
3. Partial Distraction (n = 26) 
 
78.58 
(12.37) 
66.73 
(14.95) 
.70  81.00 
(12.72) 
66.73 
(19.00) 
.99 
 
4.Full Distraction (n = 33) 
  
80.94 
(11.09) 
65.75 
(19.87) 
.98  78.09 
(15.49) 
63.79 
(20.39) 
.77 
 
5. Control (n = 31) 
 
78.32 
(13.64) 
68.52 
(23.43) 
.44   77.94 
(13.16) 
68.94 
(24.83) 
.47 
 
        
Between Condition Cohen’s d        
     Condition 1 vs. Condition 2  .93    .85  
     Condition 1 vs. Condition 3  -.19    -.25  
     Condition 1 vs. Condition 4  -.13    -.12  
     Condition 1 vs. Condition 5  -.23    -.30  
     Condition 2 vs. Condition 3  -1.37    -1.40  
     Condition 2 vs. Condition 4  -1.17    -1.18  
     Condition 2 vs. Condition 5  -1.20    -1.28  
     Condition 3 vs. Condition 4  .06    .15  
     Condition 3 vs. Condition 5  -.09    -.10  
     Condition 4 vs. Condition 5  -.13    -.23  
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Table 2 
Average Scores, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes of Emotional Discomfort and 
Believability of Negative Self-Referential Thoughts and Beck Depression Inventory-II by 
Condition and Time among Participants with Elevated Depressive Symptoms 
 
 Emotional Discomfort  Believability  BDI-II 
 
 
Conditions: 
Pre 
 
Post 
 
Pre-
Post 
within 
d 
 Pre 
 
Post 
 
Pre-
Post 
within 
d 
  
1. Partial Defusion  (n = 11) 
 
85.18 
(10.83) 
67.45 
(28.03) 
.93  83.36 
(16.23) 
56.91 
(33.65) 
1.25  18.18 
(10.81) 
2. Full Defusion  (n = 12)  
 
79.00 
(11.79) 
33.42 
(28.39) 
1.61  75.92 
(15.14) 
38.50 
(21.10) 
1.32  16.25 
(6.55) 
3. Partial Distraction (n = 17) 
 
79.76 
(13.07) 
67.47 
(15.56) 
.65  81.35 
(14.59) 
68.35 
(18.01) 
.82  16.82 
(7.21) 
4.Full Distraction (n = 16) 
  
84.56 
(12.12) 
68.13 
(23.06) 
1.07  77.88 
(16.03) 
64.13 
(24.43) 
.66  16.37 
(3.94) 
5. Control (n = 15) 
 
77.47 
(13.91) 
75.20 
(18.63) 
.16   73.60 
(13.22) 
70.33 
(19.14) 
.36   18.00 
(7.43) 
 
         
Between Condition Cohen’s d          
Condition 1 vs. Condition 2  1.21    .67    
Condition 1 vs. Condition 3  -.00    -.44    
Condition 1 vs. Condition 4 
 
 -.03    -.25    
Condition 1 vs. Condition 5 
 
 -.33    -.51    
Condition 2 vs. Condition 3 
 
 -1.56    -1.53    
Condition 2 vs. Condition 4 
 
 -1.35    -1.13    
Condition 2 vs. Condition 5 
 
 -1.78    -1.58    
Condition 3 vs. Condition 4 
 
 -.03    .20    
Condition 3 vs. Condition 5 
 
 -.45    -.11    
Condition 4 vs. Condition 5 
 
 -.34    -.29    
 
Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings of Perceived Effectiveness, Ease, and 
Intention to Use Assigned Strategy. 
 
  Effectiveness Easy to Use Intention to Use 
Partial Defusion (n = 27)  5.26 (1.23) 6.41 ( .84) 5.48 (1.45) 
Full Defusion (n = 30)  5.67 (1.47) 5.87 (1.54) 5.43 (1.74) 
Partial Distraction (n = 26)   3.96 (1.61) 4.84 (2.09) 4.23 (1.90) 
Full Distraction (n = 33)  3.91 (1.63) 5.03 (1.42) 4.27 (1.66) 
Control (n = 31)  4.10 (1.90) 5.26 (1.98) 4.23 (2.06) 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Means of emotional discomfort and believability of negative self-referential 
thoughts at pre and post by condition.
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